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Introduction 
HUGH LIEBERT 
On June 1, 1787, James Wilson moved that the Constitutional 
Convention invest executive power in a single individual. As Madison 
records, a "considerable pause" ensued as one of history's most dis-
tinguished deliberative bodies succumbed to "shyness." But of course 
the silence at the Convention was broken soon enough by speech, and 
the American presidency has since that time occasioned as much criti-
cal deliberation as mute anxiety and awe. Today, some consider the 
presidency to have grown from a mere "foetus of monarchy" into an 
"imperial presidency," while others worry that an institution intended 
to loom large and exude energy risks being fettered like Gulliver with 
legislative cables. Some see in the American executive the apostasy of 
republicanism, while others see its salvation. Given the debates that 
would follow on the heels of Wilson's proposal and continue down to 
the present, one understands why even the Convention's most daring 
delegates shied from speaking about such a singular office. 
Perhaps the most distinguished entry in the long-standing debates 
over the American executive is Harvey Mansfield's Taming the Prince.1 
Mansfield located the essence of executive power in its ambivalence. 
The political executive enforces laws passed by legislatures but con-
fronts emergencies on his own; he embodies both the passivity of the 
executor and the action of the executioner. Indeed, he can hardly be 
one without the other, for his claim to act on behalf of some larger 
force is all that prevents the exercise of his own will from engender-
ing resentment and resistance. Much of the strength of the American 
regime arises from its energetic executive, Mansfield claims, but the 
presidency is not for that reason an American original. The American 
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executive owes to Machiavelli's "new modes and orders" the doctrine 
of "indirect rule," or ruling in another's name for the sake of ruling all 
the more effectively on one's own. Machiavelli's discovery of "indirect 
rule," and with it executive power, constituted a decisive departure 
from an older tradition of political thought, which considered how one 
might rule legitimately in one's own name. When one understands both 
Machiavelli's political science and the political science it was meant to 
replace, Mansfield suggests, one can begin to appreciate the "tamed 
prince" who rules America, however ambivalently and indirectly. 
Mansfield's study of executive power was published just as the Cold 
War's conclusion seemed to predict declining demand for executive 
energy and dispatch. Since 9/11, however, debates over the nature and 
proper extent of executive power have assumed a fresh urgency. It is 
now an opportune time to reconsider executive power along the path 
that Mansfield pioneered some twenty years ago. This is what the essays 
collected in this book seek to do. The essays do not, it must be said, 
always agree with Mansfield's conclusions, but they are all informed 
by his method. They recognize that understanding executive power 
entails staging a dialogue between past and present, and between prac-
tice and theory. 
In considering the executive it is important to start from the begin-
ning. But perhaps the most peculiar aspect of executive power is that its 
beginning did not coincide with the beginning of political philosophy. 
"The whole story of executive power depends," Mansfield claims, "on 
understanding why it is absent in Aristotle."2 On Mansfield's telling, 
Aristotle and Machiavelli agreed that the fundamental problem of poli-
tics lay in the insufficiency oflaw. Even reasonable laws can arouse anger 
by violating the desire of individuals to choose for themselves; what's 
more, this anger is somewhat justified, since law's generality prevents it 
from responding adequately to the nuances of each particular case under 
its purview. Since law necessarily falls short of full justice it must appeal 
to fear, and thus even good laws inevitably involve an element of tyranny. 
The decisive question is whether this tyranny should be diminished or 
enhanced, whether law's rough edge should be dulled with deliberation 
and choice or honed into the sharp blade of an unscrupulous prince. 
The first solution is Aristotle's, the second, which leads ultimately to 
executive power, is Machiavelli's. But both are in agreement at least with 
regard to the problem to be solved. 
In his chapter, Robert Faulkner questions this claim. He acknowl-
edges that executive power is absent in Aristotle, but denies that its 
absence can be explained by "deliberation and choice" alone. Instead, 
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what sets Aristotle apart from his modern opponents is his apprecia-
tion of law's ability to win compliance witlzo11t appealing to tyrannical 
force. In the ideal case, law speaks to the moral opinion of the citizens 
it governs. It embodies, or at least appeals to, their sense of justice and 
the good. And thus law commands allegiance on its own. Because law 
is loved, it need neither be feared nor seek out strategies to minimize its 
fearsomeness. So there is no executive in Aristotle, Faulkner suggests, 
not because Aristotle found a softer solution to Machiavelli's problems, 
but because he discounted the need for "execution" altogether and with 
it the need for an executive. 
If the story of the executive does not begin with Aristotle, then, 
where does it begin? Hugh Liebert's chapter suggests that the search for 
the birth of the executive in this history of political philosophy is itself 
misconceived, because executive power existed in practice long before 
it was articulated in theory. Augustus deserves credit for its discovery; 
he beat Machiavelli to the punch. It was Augustus, after all, who pro-
claimed the restoration of the republic in order to augment his ruling 
rmo solo, and it was Augustus who founded a regime premised on just 
this sort ofindirection and ambivalence. Augustus's discovery of execu-
tive power was, however, anticipated by elements of republican politics: 
the Senate's use of indirection to sustain its oligarchy, and, perhaps even 
more significantly, the effect of imperial expansion on the mechanics of 
Roman honor. As Rome extended its theatre of operations farther and 
farther beyond the confines of the city, Liebert suggests, its political 
theatre became increasingly dominated by characters reluctant to share 
the stage with others. And these pri111i 110111ini played before an audience 
as ready to worship as to applaud, for the republic had grown too large 
for its citizens to retain any clear sense of their leaders' human dimen-
sions. The first executives, then, were not princes embalmed in theory 
but demigods presiding over a republic's demise. 
Some three centuries after Augustus established the empire, his suc-
cessor incorporated Christianity into the empire's ruling ideology. In 
a careful study of three concepts central to Machiavelli's thought-
orders, modes, and ways-Thomas Karako's chapter suggests that the 
heretical Florentine consciously trod along Christianity's "way." It was 
from Christianity that Machiavelli learned the art of indirect or hidden 
rule. Just as Christians conquered the world for God, so princes could 
conquer by portraying themselves as rulers beholden to necessity or 
fortune. In this way, Machiavelli turned toward human empowerment 
in this world techniques that had been developed with a view to man's 
life in the next world. 
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It has never been entirely clear just how Machiavelli's departure 
from ancient and medieval political thought informed the founders 
of liberalism. Paul Rahe's chapter attempts to chart the route from 
Florence to Malmesbury. Hobbes, he argues, was, in his early years, 
an attentive reader of Machiavelli. One can track Machiavelli's influ-
ence across every page of Hobbes's earliest work, the Horae Subsecivae. 3 
Although Machiavelli's trail is admittedly harder to trace in Hobbes's 
later work, Rahe claims nevertheless that the fifteenth chapter of the 
Leviathan engages intimately with the fifteenth chapter of The Prince. 
If in Hobbes's early work Machiavelli was a guide to be followed, 
however, in the pages of the Leviathan he is a rival to be refuted. It is 
not that Hobbes departs from Machiavelli's foundational claims-he 
agrees that man must be viewed in his amoral wickedness, and agrees 
too that mankind must be divided into princes and people. But 
whereas Machiavelli's thought appeals to actual and potential princes, 
Hobbes's takes the people's perspective. By tending to man in his fear, 
he claims, one can construct a sovereign more imposing than any of 
Machiavelli's princes. 
But what has this sovereign to do with the constitutional executive? 
If Hobbes's sovereign looms up above churches and legislative cham-
bers, a force for all to see, the constituted executive would seem to 
offer only fleeting glimpses of his power-when exercising his prerog-
ative, if even then. Lynn Uzzell's contribution to this book shows that 
Locke intended all of the difficulty that scholars and citizens encounter 
when trying to locate sovereignty in constitutions of separated pow-
ers. Sovereignty is indeed latent in the executive-that is, it is a hidden 
power revealed only when occasion warrants. But sovereignty is also 
latent in every other power that Locke devises. Not only the executive, 
but the legislative and the federative powers seem to waver between 
latency and actuality; even the powers of "the people" and God are 
characterized in this way. All is ambivalence and indirection. And the 
result is that powers held in reserve serve to check powers exercised in 
practice. It is fear of what might be lurking behind the apparently pas-
sive veneer of another "power" that keeps each power in check, Uzzell 
argues. A system oflatent powers, therefore, hinders the sort of tyranny 
that is all but inseparable from the awesome sovereignty one finds in 
Hobbes. 
Locke's ship of state, steadied in its course by the countervailing 
tension of its separated powers, carried Machiavelli's insights from 
England onto the shores of the New World. By the time that Locke's 
doctrines could be brought to bear at the Constitutional Convention, 
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however, much of his insight into the necessity of a strong execu-
tive had already been hard-won in practice. In political life under the 
Articles of Confederation, argues Jeffrey Sedgwick, one sees clearly the 
perils of politics without princes-but one also sees that the political 
men of the time saw those perils as well. Indeed, the legislative power, 
supreme under the Articles, all but brought its opposite number into 
being as it created standing committees and administrative heads to 
perform many of the functions that the executive would later assume. 
The Constitution is therefore better viewed as a continuation and 
refinement of tendencies already emergent under the Articles than as a 
sharp break with everything that preceded it. Executive power arose to 
integrate and unify what might otherwise fall apart-and this was true 
no less in domestic than foreign affairs. If government lacked an execu-
tive, it would have to create one. That is more or less what happened in 
the early history of the American republic. 
Even with this practical background in view, however, Locke's the-
ory of executive power was a valuable guide to the American founders. 
The trouble was, as David Nichols's chapter points out, that Locke 
was a monarchist-or at least, he framed his political thought with 
the assumption that hereditary monarchy would continue. How, then, 
could one bring Locke into line with republicanism? And how could 
one limit popular excesses when governmental authority arose only 
from the consent of the people? The leading founders developed a range 
of approaches to this problem: Hamilton argued at the Convention for a 
solution similar to Locke's own, for he thought that without institutions 
closely resembling the British monarchy and aristocracy, the Constitution 
was doomed. Jefferson favored strict construction combined with an 
executive capable of wandering outside of the Constitution on occa-
sion, anchored only in the legitimacy provided by his embodiment of 
the popular will. Madison favored a "Council of Revision" and other 
mechanisms by which the federal government might protect its rights 
and the rights of individuals against the excesses of state legislatures. 
The Constitution itself, argues Nichols, represents a distinct and 
persuasive solution to the problem of "unLock[e]ing" republican 
government. Instead of grounding executive power in an extraconsti-
tutional popular will, the Constitution trusted in the Electoral College 
and in the Constitution's own authority (which had, after all, arisen 
from popular ratification) to confer sufficient power on the presi-
dent. Instead of relying on a Council of Revision, the Constitution 
trusted the national judiciary and national legislature to protect the 
rights of the national government and of individuals. The heroes of 
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Nichols's story are therefore men like James Wilson and Gouverneur 
Morris-not the founders destined for the greatest fame, perhaps, but 
still deserving of our respect for their prescient faith in what Nichols 
calls the "Constitutional alternative." 
Perhaps the most important feature of this Constitution with a view 
to present controversies over presidential power is its insistence on 
concurrent powers. As William Galston argues in his contribution to 
this book, for all of the energy of the Constitution's executive branch, 
it shares its most distinctive powers with other branches. The found-
ers very much intended the Constitution as "an invitation to struggle 
for the privilege of directing American foreign policy"-and for the 
privilege of directing every other sort of policy, for that matter.4 They 
did so because concurrent powers seemed to further the goal they 
most cherished-not governmental efficiency, but the prevention of 
tyranny. Presidents such as Lincoln and Truman, even at their most 
energetic, respected this tradition of concurrent powers. In the wake 
of 9/11, Galston claims, President Bush did not. The Bush administra-
tion's attempt to exclude the legislative and judicial branches from any 
significant role in the conduct of the global war on terror amounted 
to a radical break from the nation's most important constitutional 
traditions. 
Where Galston sees a presidency willfully departing from constitu-
tional precedent, Karen Hult, Alison Smith, and John Yoo present a 
presidency prone more to undue constraint than to expansion. Hult's 
chapter contends that the modern presidency is hampered not so much 
by legislative meddling as by the i1ifor111al demands of present-day poli-
tics. The president presides over a bureaucracy too large and unwieldy 
for him to control; as a result, he frequently finds his legislative and 
administrative agenda stymied by inertia and unaccountability. The 
president also faces the challenge of packaging himself and messaging 
his arguments in order to break through all the crush and clutter of 
contemporary media. With bureaucrats and reporters and handlers and 
infighters surrounding him, how is a president to be his own man? The 
proper worry, Hult suggests, is not imperial presidents but imperiled 
presidents, lacking the energy to do much good-or for that matter, 
much of anything at all. 
To know what he may lawfully do, the president requires the advice 
oflawyers. Ever since the 1930s, the president has relied in particular on 
the lawyers housed in the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) to interpret 
his constitutional powers for him. This office has been at the center of 
recent controversies over the War on Terror, since many of its memos 
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seemed to their detractors overly politicized, and thus unbecoming of 
an office they considered the "conscience for the government." In her 
contribution, Alison Smith questions this view of the OLC. It is of 
the nature of the OLC to be political rather than impartial and con-
scientious, she argues, and its inherently political tendencies have only 
increased thanks to three decades of congressional attempts to usurp 
executive powers. The presidency is weakened, moreover, when the 
lawyers who serve it are forced to contend with the will of an attentive 
and angry public. In the end, Smith suggests, casting the OLC as gov-
ernment's conscience only increases the furor and recriminations that 
arise when its lawyers fall short of this lofty vocation-as they must. 
A president is constrained not only by the nettlesome necessities of 
modern leadership and by the diminishment of his advisors, however, 
but by the tectonic realities of geopolitics. The first year of the Obama 
administration, according to Jo.hn Yoo's chapter, provides a telling case 
in point. Obama rose to the presidency hoping to change course on 
many questions arising from the War on Terror-detention, interroga-
tion, trying terrorists, and so on. In the early days of his presidency, 
it seemed as though he might succeed. But Obama learned quickly, 
Yoo suggests, that terrorism appears more threatening from the Oval 
Office than from the campaign trail. And as a result, President Obama 
began to recognize the wisdom of many of his predecessor's policies. 
Politics, and particularly foreign policy, sometimes require us to choose 
between our safety and our ideals, Yoo claims. But such a choice need 
not entail the abandonment of the Constitution, for the Constitution 
draws its strength from its ability to countenance just such necessities. 
If, in order to prosecute the War on Terror, the president must pur-
sue policies that in more peaceful times might seem unsavory, it only 
redounds to the glory of the founders that they framed the executive 
office with sufficient flexibility to make this possible. 
Not every founder was so sanguine regarding the president's war 
powers. Just before James Wilson silenced the Convention by propos-
ing a unitary executive, Charles Pinckney of South Carolina warned 
that if executive power were to extend to "peace & war &c.," it would 
render the executive a "monarchy, of the worst kind, to wit an elective 
one." Since the legislative has largely resigned to the executive its right 
to declare and oversee wars, Pinckney's fears may seem to have been 
realized. 
Mansfield's Taming the Prince was published as a generations-long 
war-a war never formally declared by the legislative-was com-
ing to an end. Mansfield presented the president as a distant heir to 
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Machiavellian wisdom. And as he told it, the story of how the president 
assumed his inheritance made for a captivating, Coppola-esque saga of 
an Italian living for a while in England and then making the journey to 
the New World, hidden beneath decks. But Mansfield's president was 
not quite the elective monarch that Pinckney feared, for ambivalence 
was of his essence; unlike a monarch, the president was not meant to 
rule in his own name. While he might show a little Machiavellian virtu 
every now and then when he ventured out beyond the bounds of the 
law to meet a crisis, he would race just as quickly back in to avoid stir-
ring up resistance to his rule. 
But what happens to tamed princes when crises linger and states of 
exception become the rule? As scholars and citizens faced yet another 
generational struggle so shortly on the heels of the Cold War, this was 
the question that inspired fear on the republic's behalf It is in address-
ingjust this question that Mansfield's method proves most valuable. For 
if one accepts that in practice the executive provides the Constitution's 
point of closest contact with the world outside of convention-that 
is, the world of necessity and of virtue-contemplation of the execu-
tive might seem to require one to depart from convention in theory as 
well as in practice. Perhaps one must practice political philosophy to 
approach the executive properly, and thus put oneself in the place of 
a founder rather than a mere citizen. Americans can learn much from 
their own founders' deliberations as they attempted to comprehend 
and constitute executive power, but they stand to learn just as much, 
perhaps, from what Madison called their "shyness"-the moment of 
reflective, worried silence that preceded their deliberations. 
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